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Zorana S. Todorović
THE MORAL STATUS OF ANIMALS: DEGREES OF MORAL 
STATUS AND THE INTEREST-BASED APPROACH
ABSTRACT
This paper addresses the issue of the moral status of non-human animals, 
or the question whether sentient animals are morally considerable. The 
arguments for and against the moral status of animals are discussed, 
above all the argument from marginal cases. It is argued that sentient 
animals have moral status based on their having interests in their 
experiential well-being, but that there are degrees of moral status. Two 
interest-based approaches are presented and discussed: DeGrazia’s view 
that sentient animals have interests in continuing to live, and that their 
interests should be granted moral weight; and McMahan’s TRIA which 
similarly postulates that animals have interests and that in a given situation 
we should compare the human and animal interests at stake. Finally, the 
paper concludes that the anthropocentric approach to animal ethics 
should be abandoned in favour of the biocentric ethics.
Introduction: Arguments for and against  
the Moral Status of Animals
The purpose of this paper is to question the view that non-human animals do 
not have moral status, and to provide compelling arguments for their moral 
considerability. Specifically, it is argued that sentient animals should be moral­
ly considerable based on their having interests in their experiential well-be-
ing. Even though sentient animals have interests that should be granted  moral 
weight, there are morally relevant differences among different animals, so 
there seem to be different degrees of moral status. These differences should 
be taken into account when comparing the interests of humans and animals 
in a specific situation, as suggested by the interest­based approach that will 
be discussed below.
The problem of moral status of non-human animals and the question  whether 
humans as moral agents have duties to animals is examined in a branch of  ethics 
called animal ethics. The central issue discussed in this field is whether (at 
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least some) animals are beings that are due moral consideration, and whether 
humans should take into account their interests or well-being when making 
moral decisions. Different ethical theories vary in terms of their answers to 
this question and arguments they provide to support their theses. The tradi-
tional view is that animals, unlike humans, do not have moral status (or have 
slight moral status) because they have no characteristic features of moral be-
ings – rationality, autonomy, self-consciousness, use of language – and thus 
humans do not have moral duties to animals.
One of the most convincing arguments for moral considerability of animals 
is the argument from marginal cases or marginal humans (the AMC), which 
challenges the traditional view that animals do not have moral status. The term 
‘marginal humans’ refers to humans who lack some of the characteristics that 
are traditionally considered relevant to moral status (rationality, etc.), which 
is why they are not full members of the moral community. Some philosophers 
distinguish among three subtypes of marginal humans: ‘pre-moral’ humans 
(infants) – potential moral beings who will become moral or full members of 
the moral community if they develop normally; ‘post-moral’ – human adults 
who used to be moral but are no longer so because of their old age or illness 
(dementia); lastly, ‘non­moral’ human adults who have never been nor will they 
ever be members of the moral community due to serious mental illness or ac-
cident (Scruton 2000: 42).
The main problem pointed out by the argument from marginal cases is that 
not all humans are completely rational, autonomous, etc., and that so-called 
marginal humans do not have these morally relevant characteristics to a de-
gree that is sufficient for moral status, while some animals have these capaci-
ties more developed than some humans. The point of this argument is that 
if marginal humans are morally considerable, then animals that have similar 
morally relevant capacities should be morally considerable too. Accordingly, 
in order to be consistent, we have to admit either that marginal humans have 
slight moral status like animals, or that animals have the same moral status as 
marginal humans. In other words, the moral status of animals should be, for 
the sake of consistency, same as the moral status of marginal humans. There-
fore, if marginal humans are thought to be morally considerable, then moral 
considerability of relevantly similar animals cannot be denied; on the other 
hand, if animals are not morally considerable, then neither are marginal hu-
mans (Tanner 2006: 50).
The view that animals have moral standing and that they should have the 
same moral status as marginal humans is challenged by contesting the argument 
from marginal cases. One of the attempts to counter this argument is with the 
argument from kinds: it is argued that humans are such a kind of beings that 
are usually morally considerable, which does not depend on the characteris-
tics of an individual being but on the characteristic features of its kind. In nor-
mal circumstances, human beings are members of the moral community and 
the fact that some humans, such as marginal cases, lack some capacities (e.g. 
rationality) does not cancel their moral considerability. Unlike human beings, 
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animals do not belong to the moral community, nor do they have the potential 
for belonging to it, because they are not that kind of thing (Scruton 2000: 43). 
But this argument is clearly speciesism1 – all humans are thought to deserve 
moral consideration while no animals do, because they are not of the right kind 
– the human kind, regardless of the fact that some animals have similar capaci-
ties as marginal humans. However, it is not clear why belonging to the human 
kind should be morally relevant; humans belong to different natural kinds, 
for example, mammals, living being, etc. Besides, the human kind could have 
evolved quite differently and humans could have been less rational, etc. than 
other species, and yet they would still be morally considerable while members 
of other species would not, which is contradictory (Tanner 2006: 55).
A more appropriate criterion of moral considerability would be possession of 
some characteristic or capacity, which is the basis for ascribing moral consider-
ability to a being. However, scientific evidence currently available indicates 
that all the characteristics and capacities that human beings have can be found 
to some degree in non­human animals too. Many scientists point out that the 
difference between humans and other animals is only a difference in degree and 
not in kind, which also applies to mental capacities (Darwin 1871/1981; Pank-
sepp 2011). The differences between humans and non­human animals are not 
sufficient grounds for denying non­human animals moral consideration. With 
this in mind, those who argue that only humans have moral standing should 
show that all humans, including marginal cases, have some morally relevant 
characteristic or characteristics that no animals have, which is why they are 
not morally considerable. Only in this way could the argument from margin-
al cases be refuted and that is precisely its strength, because it requires taking 
a consistent attitude towards animals, thereby effectively shifting the burden 
of proof to proponents of the view that animals are not morally considerable.
The Moral Status of Sentient Animals:  
Are there Degrees of Moral Status?
First of all, the concept of moral considerability or moral status should be 
clarified. In DeGrazia’s view, to have moral status means to have independent 
or direct moral importance, and the moral importance of a being with moral 
status is closely related to interests or well­being of that being. A being X has 
moral status if: “(1) moral agents have obligations regarding X, (2) X has in-
terests, and (3) the obligations are based (at least partly) on X’s interests” (De-
Grazia 2008: 183).
When discussing the moral status of animals, it seems crucial to examine 
their mental life more thoroughly, in order to understand what their interests 
1  Speciesism is a term coined by analogy with other forms of discrimination, such as 
racism or sexism. The term became widespread after Singer used it in his book (Singer 
1975), although, by his own admission, he did not coin it but a British psychologist 
Richard Ryder in 1970.
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are and what it really means to take their interests into account. Our attitude 
about how we should treat animals depends on what kind of mental capaci-
ties we attribute to them; thus we can differentiate between animals that are 
not sentient, those that are sentient nonpersons, and animals that could quali-
fy as borderline cases of persons ­ such as great apes and dolphins (DeGrazia 
2016: 511). Sentience can be defined as the capacity to feel or experience feel-
ings – sensations, emotions, and moods, which implies the existence of con-
scious experience. Many scientists believe that the capacity to feel pain is suf-
ficient for sentience. DeGrazia points out that the available evidence supports 
the thesis that mammals and birds are typically sentient beings, while there 
is convincing evidence that all vertebrates are mostly sentient beings too, and 
among invertebrates at least cephalopods. Examples of sentient nonpersons to 
keep in mind when discussing the moral status of animals are cats, dogs, cows, 
rodents, eagles, etc.; this category also includes some human beings, such as 
infants and people in advanced stages of Alzheimer’s disease, which are so­
called ‘marginal’ or contested cases, as DeGrazia calls them.
Sentient animals by definition have an experiential well-being or welfare, 
which is common to all sentient beings, as well as interests in their experiential 
welfare. Interests are understood as a component of one’s well­being (welfare 
interests) and not something a being is interested in. Since they have interests, 
animals can be harmed, because the basic interest as regards one’s well-being 
is in not suffering. Of course, we refer here to sentient animals, which also ap-
plies below when we discuss the interests of animals and their moral status. 
DeGrazia argues that sentient animals have moral status (at least some degree 
of moral status) since they can be treated cruelly, because that can be the only 
plausible explanation why it is wrong, and this thesis is supported by most of 
the leading studies in animal ethics (DeGrazia 1996: 43). Instead of the moral 
status of animals, we could talk about our obligations to them, such as the ob-
ligation not to harm them needlessly, which is grounded in their interests in 
their own experiential welfare.
However, there are different views about whether animals have the same 
moral status as humans or they differ in moral status, and whether we should 
extend equal consideration to their interests. The view that we should give 
equal consideration to interests of human persons and sentient animals (Equal 
Consideration View) grants equal moral importance to their comparable inter-
ests (DeGrazia 2008: 189). The example of such an interest shared by many dif-
ferent species is in the above experiential well-being. This really means that it 
is equally wrong to cause suffering to a sentient animal and a human person, 
which is certainly contrary to our usual everyday treatment of animals. With-
in this approach, it can be argued that although all sentient beings deserve to 
be granted equal moral consideration to their comparable interests, many of 
their interests are not comparable, which justifies different moral protections 
(Unequal Interests Model). Thus, the interests of persons and animals when it 
comes to life are not equal because persons have a greater interest in staying 
alive, so it is worse to kill a human person than a sentient animal. 
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This view is consistent with the intuitions of most people, including ani-
mal lovers and animal rights activists. In cases of conflict, when one has to de-
cide whether to save a person or an animal, people would generally agree that 
a person should be saved and not an animal. A well­known example of such 
a case is a lifeboat scenario, in which either a man or a dog has to be tossed 
overboard, otherwise the boat would sink and everyone aboard would drown. 
Another example is when one has to choose whom to rescue from a burning 
building – a person or a dog2. This approach clearly implies that human persons 
have higher moral status than sentient animals. Contrary to this view, some 
theorists who argue for equal consideration given to human persons and sen-
tient animals believe that there are no degrees of moral status and that a being 
either has moral status or lacks it (Harman 2003: 183). Their explanation of 
the common belief that it is worse to kill a person than an animal is that death 
harms persons more than animals, and it is generally worse to cause more harm.
Another model of positing the difference in moral status between humans 
and animals are theories that give unequal consideration to persons and sen-
tient animals (Unequal Consideration Model). According to these theories, even 
though sentient animals have moral status and we should give moral weight 
to their interests (such as the interests in their experiential well­being), ani-
mals’ interests have less moral importance than persons’ comparable interests. 
This means that it is morally worse to cause suffering to a person than to cause 
equal suffering to a sentient animal because, even though their interests in not 
suffering are comparable, the person’s interests have greater moral importance 
than those of a sentient nonperson. 
There are two different versions of the view that humans have higher  moral 
status than animals, which asserts degrees of moral status. The “two­tier  model” 
attributes one level of moral status to persons and another, lower level of moral 
status to sentient nonpersons. The “sliding­scale model” posits that there is a 
scale of degrees of moral status, depending on the degree of cognitive, affec-
tive, and social complexity of a being; while all persons have equal moral status, 
sentient nonpersons vary in degrees of their moral status ( DeGrazia 2008: 192). 
According to this model, persons have the highest  moral status, followed by 
great apes and dolphins, then other monkeys and elephants, other mammals, 
and so on down the phylogenetic scale all the way to barely sentient beings.
Various arguments could be provided in favour of the sliding­scale view 
that there are degrees of moral status. It could be said that persons are special 
in their moral status because they are moral agents – beings who have mo-
ral obligations and responsibilities, which justifies their higher moral status. 
Animals are not moral agents but, as sentient beings, they have moral sta-
tus. Furthermore, if sentience is considered to be the fundamental criterion 
of moral status, and different kinds of sentient beings have different degrees 
of sentience, this supports the thesis that there is a scale of degrees of moral 
2  Also, we can think of a version of the well­known trolley problem, so that a person is 
standing on one track, and on the other there is a sentient animal or even a couple of them.
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status. Additional arguments refer to our common sense beliefs that humans 
and animals do not have the same level of moral status, and that sentient ani-
mals differ among themselves in terms of their moral importance or the de-
gree of moral status.3
Animals’ Moral Status Grounded in Their Interests
A rather nuanced view about the moral status of animals has been elaborated 
by the above­mentioned David DeGrazia. DeGrazia agrees with the view that 
animals are due moral consideration and that we have obligations to them based 
on their interests or welfare. He believes that many animals have moral status, 
but there are morally relevant differences among different animals; thus we can 
speak of degrees of moral status, depending on whether animals could qualify 
as borderline cases of persons like great apes and dolphins, or sentient nonper-
sons such as other mammals and birds, or they are not sentient beings at all. 
Since many animals are sentient beings – even if they are not persons – who 
have moral status and whose interests should be granted moral weight, De-
Grazia questions whether it is morally justified to kill them, for example after 
their use as laboratory animals in experiments. If sentient animals have mo ral 
status, humans as moral agents have obligations to them, not to harm them 
needlessly. DeGrazia points out that death harms not only persons by depriv-
ing them of the net good their lives would have contained, but it also harms 
sentient nonpersons for the same reason, because it deprives them of lives that 
contain prudential goods4 or would have contained them. Having conscious 
experiences is a precondition for an animal’s life to contain prudential goods, 
which makes life worth continuing for that animal (DeGrazia 2016: 512). Ac-
cordingly, if lives of sentient animals (and other sentient nonpersons) are worth 
continuing and if they have interests in continuing to live, death harms them 
by depriving them of the goods or the net good within their lives.
The next relevant question that is raised is whether death in fact harms sen-
tient animals less than it harms persons, which is a common opinion of most 
people. DeGrazia discusses the theoretical basis of this view and its arguments. 
Objective theories are based on the claim that persons have certain capacities 
(cognitive and emotional) that sentient animals lack, which enable them ac-
tivities and experiences that are highly valued in assessing one’s well-being; 
this explains why a person has a higher quality of life than a sentient animal. 
3  This can be illustrated in the following way; most people would agree that it would 
be acceptable to kill an animal (which would involve some degree of suffering), if it 
would save a person’s life or if it was necessary to preserve a person’s health. When it 
comes to our beliefs about different moral status of different animals, a good example 
would be killing rats as part of pest control, which most people would find acceptable, 
even if it causes their suffering.
4  The term ‘prudential goods’ is used to refer to the goods that subject’s life has to 
contain in order to be worth living. It relates to what is good for someone whose life it is 
and not in itself (Sumner 1995: 769–770; Višak, Garner 2016: 5).
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DeGrazia challenges the explanation that uses an objective account of well­be-
ing, pointing out that the subjective quality of life of a sentient animal who is 
faring well (for example a dog) does not have to be lower than the quality of 
life of a person who is faring well. There is an implicitly made distinction here 
between well-being or welfare and faring well or being well­off, which will be 
discussed further in the next section (McMahan 1996: 9–10). 
In DeGrazia’s view, it would be wrong to assume that persons’ lives are more 
valuable than lives of sentient animals on the grounds that persons have cer-
tain capacities that sentient animals lack. This would imply attaching greater 
value to typically human capacities and associated activities or experiences, 
while undervaluing animals’ capacities and experiences that are less devel-
oped in humans or that humans lack. In fact, some animals have more devel-
oped senses than humans, such as the auditory and olfactory senses, so they 
are likely to have richer sensory experiences than humans, which contribute to 
their well­being and faring well. Thus, DeGrazia believes that the well­being 
of a being is determined by the type of functioning characteristic of that kind 
of being. There is no objective list of values that applies to all kinds of beings, 
and the assessment of the value of life is relative to the kind of being in ques-
tion and the innate capacities of such being.
DeGrazia’s approach is clearly on the right track in that he rejects an ob-
jective account of well-being and asserts that the subjective quality of life of a 
sentient animal is not necessarily lower than a person’s quality of life, which 
also applies to the value of life. The loss of life that is worth living harms sen-
tient animals, since it deprives them of the goods their future lives would have 
contained. Also, DeGrazia points out that humans as moral agents have obliga-
tions to sentient animals because they have moral status. However, if different 
sorts of sentient animals have varying degrees of moral status, does that mean 
there are varying degrees of obligations that humans have to different animal 
species? In a specific situation, how could we assess what our obligations to a 
particular sentient animal are?
The theory that, in DeGrazia’s opinion, explains satisfactorily the asser-
tion that death harms persons more than sentient animals is Jeff McMahan’s 
Time-Relative Interest Account or TRIA.5
The basic idea of the TRIA, applied to the harm of death, is that in determining 
how harmful a particular death is to the individual who dies, we must take into 
account not only (1) the value of the life that the individual would have had, had 
he not died at that point – what I’ve here called the net good of the life – but 
also (2) the extent to which the subject is psychologically related to his possible 
future life at the time he dies. (DeGrazia 2016: 515)
According to this account, the value of the life lost is a function of the qua­
lity of that life and its quantity. Quantity is measured in the length of time of 
5  DeGrazia points out that some McMahan’s ideas come from Derek Parfit, including 
the concept of psychological connectedness or relatedness. 
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life lost, while quality is a function of the subjective quality of life that is ex-
perienced and the psychological connectedness of the subject at the time of 
death to herself in the possible future. The concept of psychological connect-
edness refers to a feeling of connection to oneself in the past and the future, 
and it could also be called psychological unity or psychological continuity over 
time. The value of the life lost or the harm of death could be assessed using the 
following formula: “HoD6 = [(Subjective q. of life7 x Time) of life lost] x Psy-
chological unity” (ibid.: 516).
When this formula is applied to a sentient animal, for example a dog, it 
can be explained why death harms an animal less than it harms a person (with 
the exception of animals that are persons, if there are any). If we compare the 
harm of death of a pet dog and a grandmother, who both die five years earli-
er than they would otherwise have died, the quantity of life lost would be the 
same, and it could be said that their subjective quality of life would be similar; 
only the psychological connectedness would be different – grandma would 
have much more psychological unity, assuming she is not demented. DeGra-
zia points out that most of the animals we come across every day – pets, do-
mestic animals, most animals in zoos and laboratories – are sentient animals 
who have some psychological unity to a greater or lesser degree, because they 
have the capacity to feel pain, but also a lasting desire not to feel pain, which 
brings about psychological connectedness to oneself over time. Accordingly, 
although killing those animals is less harmful than it would be in the case of 
persons, death still deprives them of lives that would have been worth continu-
ing. In DeGrazia’s view, our current practice of using animals is largely morally 
unacceptable, and he argues for discontinuing at least the practice of routine 
killing of animals after their use in experiments.
Comparing Relative Interests of Sentient Beings
Another elaborate view on the degrees of moral status has been developed by 
Jeff McMahan, whose Time­Relative Interest Account (TRIA) was already in-
troduced in the previous section. Like DeGrazia, McMahan believes that moral 
status is not ‘all-or-nothing’ phenomenon, and that there is a range of degrees 
of moral status. Sentient beings or individuals that have basic consciousness, 
on the basis of which they have interests, have a minimal moral status and our 
treatment of them should be guided simply by our concern for their interests. 
Animals are such sentient beings that are capable of physical suffering like 
human beings, but they are not self-conscious – or their self-consciousness is 
only rudimentary. They have no desires or intentions concerning the future 
and are incapable of making plans, which is why they are weakly psychologi-
cally connected to themselves in the future (McMahan 2008: 67). 
6  HoD ­ Harm of death
7  Subjective quality of life
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There are various degrees of psychological connectedness of animals – 
weaker and stronger psychological connectedness, as well as psychological 
unconnectedness, but McMahan suggests that only some lowest forms of ani-
mals are totally unconnected (McMahan 2015: 84–85). Weakly connected ani­
mals have consciousness but a low degree of self-consciousness, and they can 
experience suffering and pleasure but have no memory of it. More strongly 
connected animals, such as great apes, have a higher degree of self-conscious-
ness, but even those animals are weakly connected to themselves compared 
with psychological connectedness of human persons. Whether it is permissible 
to kill an animal or not depends on the degree to which it is psychologically 
connected to itself, because even though they are not persons and they have 
lower moral status than persons, they have interests and it would be against 
their interests to be killed.
The common belief of most people that it is worse to kill a human being 
than an animal and that in cases of conflict, a human should be saved and not 
an animal, is explained by asserting that human beings have a higher level of 
well­being than animals. In McMahan’s view, the level and form of well­being 
that an individual can have is determined by his or her cognitive and emotion-
al capacities and potentials. Since animals do not have many of the capacities 
that humans have, they have a lower level of well­being than (normal) human 
beings, and certain dimensions of well-being are not accessible to them. Never-
theless, an animal (for example a dog), even though it has a relatively low  level 
of well­being compared to a normal human adult, can be well­off and have a 
good life. McMahan distinguishes between the level of well-being and being 
well-off or fortunate, a distinction that was already mentioned in the previous 
section. This notion of fortune, or how an individual’s life is going, is “a rela-
tion between an individual’s level of well-being and a standard against which 
well­being is assessed” (McMahan 1996: 9). Specifically, how well­off a  being 
is depends on the relation between its level of well-being and the levels of 
well­being accessible to beings with the (highest possible) cognitive and emo-
tional capacities that are characteristics of its species.
McMahan’s account of why death is bad for an individual who dies is based 
on the magnitude of the loss suffered by the individual. When a person dies, it 
involves the loss of a great deal of future good, and the person would have been 
strongly connected to the subject of the good that is lost (McMahan 2002: 171). 
Unlike human beings, most animals live mainly in the present and are largely 
psychologically unconnected to themselves in the future, like human beings 
in the early stages of their lives. The strength of an animal’s interest in con-
tinuing to live depends not only on the amount of future goods it is deprived 
of through death, but also on the degree of its psychological connectedness to 
itself in the future. Although the loss of future goods contributes to the bad-
ness of death, animals are very weakly psychologically connected to them-
selves in the future so they have no desire for the future goods at the time of 
death. The weaker psychological connectedness to oneself in the future, the 
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weaker one’s interests in continuing to live, and less bad death is. This is the 
above­mentioned Time­Relative Interest Account:
[…] the extent to which death is a misfortune for an individual is a function 
primarily of two independent factors: (1) the amount of good life of which the 
individual is deprived by death and (2) the extent to which the individual at the 
time of death would have been psychologically connected to himself at those 
times in the future when the good things in his life would have occurred. (Mc-
Mahan 2015: 70)
Using TRIA, McMahan seeks to explain why death is less bad for animals 
than for human beings - not only because their future lives would have been 
less good, but also because of a weaker degree of their psychological connect-
edness to themselves in the future. This explanation could be used as an ar-
gument for ‘benign carnivorism’ or ‘humane omnivorism’, which refers to the 
practice of rearing animals humanely to be used for human consumption. This 
practice is usually considered humane because animals are raised in humane 
conditions and killed painlessly, so they do not suffer or experience fear. Un-
like intensive animal farming that involves their suffering and unnatural living 
conditions, it seems that such ‘humane’ way of raising animals might be good 
for them, regardless of the fact that the ultimate goal is to use them for human 
consumption. However, McMahan challenges the justifiability of this practice 
and questions whether it is morally permissible.
The main argument (the so­called benefit argument) put forward in favour 
of the practice of benign carnivorism is that animals raised in this way would 
not have existed without this practice, and that these animals have good lives, 
so it is good for them overall – for these animals it is better to exist and to have 
lives worth living, even though they are killed later, than never to exist at all. 
On the other hand, death is bad for them because they are killed much earlier 
than they would have died of natural causes, so it deprives them of lives that 
are worth living and the goods they would have had in their future lives. How-
ever, the loss suffered by animals and its significance must be discounted for 
their weak psychological continuity in their lives.
Since animals are not persons, in McMahan’s opinion, they do not have 
rights as human persons, so that cannot be an objection to this practice or used 
as grounds for its rejection. However, although they have no rights, animals 
have interests, and McMahan believes that this practice should be re­exam­
ined by taking into account the interests at stake. In a specific situation, we 
should compare the interests of beings affected by the situation, and weigh all 
of them to see whose interests are stronger. These interests should be com-
pared in line with the above TRIA:
[…] Consider an animal whose flesh could provide one meal each for twenty 
people. How might the human and animal interests compare? It seems that 
we have to compare the animal’s interest in continuing to live – a function of 
both the amount of good that its life would contain were it not killed, and the 
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degree to which it would be psychologically connected to itself in the future – 
with twenty people’s interests in the pleasure they would get from eating the 
animal. (McMahan 2008: 70)
In the above example, when the interests of an animal (for example a pig) 
are compared with the interests of people in that situation, it is obvious that 
the interest of the animal in continuing to live and all the good it would have 
in life outweighs the interests of the people in enjoying a meat dish. Even if 
we only compare the pleasure that twenty people would get from eating the 
animal, say a pig, with the pleasures that the pig would get from eating sever-
al meals a day for several years (which the pig would have were it not killed), 
it is clear that the pig’s pleasures would outweigh the difference in pleasure 
that twenty people would get from eating that pig instead of eating a vegetar-
ian meal. Of course, the strength of the animal’s interests should be discount-
ed for its weak psychological connectedness to its future interests; still, the 
animal’s interests in not being killed – the pig in the above example – would 
outweigh the people’s interests in eating it. Accordingly, McMahan argues that 
the practice of raising animals “humanely” and killing them painlessly cannot 
be justified by referring to the interests of everyone affected, because the loss 
caused by killing animals far outweighs the benefits that “humane” carnivores 
or omnivores have (McMahan 2015: 85).
But there is a problem with the existing farms where animals are raised 
this way. Suppose farmers who practice this kind of animal husbandry real-
ise that it is not justifiable to kill animals as part of the practice, because the 
interests of these animals in continuing to live outweigh the interests of peo-
ple in eating them. What should they do then? Would they have an obligation 
to feed them until they die naturally? If not, would it be justifiable to release 
them, even though it is a well-known fact that domestic animals could not 
survive in the wild? Keeping this in mind, it seems that it would be better for 
these animals to be painlessly killed than to suffer and die slowly in the wild. 
If it would be better for these animals to be euthanized, would in that case be 
permissible to use their meat, i.e. for people to eat them? This would bring us 
back to where we started and thus prolong the practice of breeding animals 
for human consumption. McMahan points out that the problem could lie in 
the disputable assumption that it is permissible to cause an individual to ex-
ist for one’s own purposes without acquiring obligations to this individual. In 
his opinion, if we cause the existence of a being that is dependent and cannot 
survive on its own, that makes us responsible and under an obligation to take 
care of it (McMahan 2008: 72). 
This argument against the practice of raising animals and killing them pre-
maturely seems convincing; since human beings started the practice that in-
volves causing animals to exist for human needs and killing them much earlier 
than they would have died naturally, humans are responsible for these animals 
and should bear the cost of caring for them, even to the natural end of their 
lives if this practice is discontinued. This is in fact another option in the event 
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of discontinuing the practice of ‘humane’ carnivorism, which  McMahan does 
not really take seriously: there is a choice not only between the option of not 
bringing animals into existence at all, and the option of causing animals to exist 
and then killing them; there is also a possibility that these ani mals are raised and 
not killed. Given his comparison between the interests of animals and people 
in the situation, McMahan should take this option into consideration, bearing 
in mind his view that most animals that are raised for human consumption are 
psychologically connected to themselves to a greater or lesser degree – pigs 
more than cows, and cows more than chickens (McMahan 2015: 85). Conse-
quently, their interests in continuing to live would in most cases outweigh the 
interests of people in eating them. A recent real­life example points precise-
ly to such a possibility of giving up animal breeding for human consumption 
and continuing to take care of them; at the Larkspur cattle farm in Colorado, 
the owners quit selling cattle for slaughter, and turned the farm into an ani-
mal sanctuary.8
Despite some weaknesses in McMahan’s account, the advantage of his TRIA 
is that it enables us to compare the interests of animals and humans on equal 
terms, which opens a possibility that the interests of animals could outweigh 
the interests of people in a specific situation. Still, the most important value 
of his theory is that it recognizes the responsibility of humans and their duties 
to take care of animals they brought into existence for their own needs, thus 
paving the way for discontinuing animal husbandry, including the practice of 
‘humane carnivorism’.
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to show why the traditional view that animals 
do not have moral status is no longer tenable. An alternative view has been 
put forward that sentient animals are due moral consideration on the basis of 
their interests. This interest-based approach provides a much better explana-
tion of why it seems wrong to treat animals cruelly and to cause their suffering.
The present-day understanding of morality is extremely anthropocentric 
– only humans are considered to be moral subjects, while animals are exclud-
ed from the moral community. The view that the moral community should 
be expanded to include other species points to the fact that the boundary of 
moral considerability does not coincide with the boundary of our species. The 
boundary of human species is based on mere biological data and is morally ir-
relevant, and a sound ethic should not be based on bias or arbitrary discrimi-
nation that favours our own species ­ speciesism (Cavalieri, Singer 1993: 304). 
Evidence shows that some morally relevant characteristics of members of the 
human species and members of other species overlap, and that many animals 
have these morally relevant characteristics or capacities. Sentience is general-
ly considered to be a morally relevant characteristic, and different views vary 
8  It is The Surf and Turf Animal Sanctuary (Stratostinetskaya, internet).
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only in terms of the question whether the moral status of animals is the same 
as the moral status of humans or not.
An endeavour to overcome the anthropocentric approach and shift towards 
a biocentric view of the world around us would imply the awareness that man 
is not the centre of the world and that all living beings have their own value, 
their raison d’être. Taking a different, biocentric approach is especially im-
portant when it comes to ethical dilemmas concerning the moral status of 
ani mals. Given that scientific findings suggest that a multitude of non­human 
animals experience emotional feelings, it calls into question the anthropocen-
tric  approach to ethics and the exclusion of animals from the moral communi-
ty. Biocentric ethics respects the life of every sentient being, both human and 
non-human, because all sentient living beings have an experiential well-being 
and can fare better or worse. Applying moral principles of biocentrism for the 
sake of protecting the welfare of non-human animals, assuming that we do 
care about their welfare and that we deem it important just how we treat other 
sentient beings even though they do not belong to our species, would enable 
us to create conditions for a higher level of well-being of all sentient animals.
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Moralni status životinja: stepeni moralnog statusa  
i pristup zasnovan na interesima
Apstrakt:
Tema ovog rada je problem moralnog statusa ne-ljudskih životinja, tj. pitanje da li osećajne 
životinje imaju moralni značaj. Razmatraju se argumenti u prilog i protiv moralne relevantno-
sti životinja, pre svega argument marginalnih slučajeva. Zastupa se tvrdnja da osećajne živo-
tinje imaju moralni status na osnovu toga što imaju interese u pogledu svoje iskustvene do-
brobiti, ali da postoje različiti stepeni moralnog statusa. Predstavljaju se i razmatraju dva 
pristupa zasnovana na interesima: Degrasijino gledište da osećajne životinje imaju interes 
da nastave da žive i da treba pripisati moralni značaj njihovim interesima. i Mekmanova TRIA 
teorija koja slično tome postulira da životinje imaju interese i da bi u datoj situaciji trebalo 
uporediti interese ljudi i životinja u pitanju. Najzad, zaključak je da bi trebalo odustati od an-
tropocentričnog pristupa zarad biocentrične etike.
Ključne reči: životinja, osećajna, moralni status, dobrobit, interesi, ljudi, osobe
